Lab Leaks, Pandemics, and a World At Risk
From the Publisher:
In public, the "lab leak" hypothesis was labeled a conspiracy theory. Yet in private, some of the world's elite scientists discussed the very real possibility that the Covid-19 pandemic started with a lab accident. They knew what the public doesn't: Lab accidents happen with alarming frequency. Even at the world's best-run labs. History shows there are a stunning number of ways "lab leaks" can happen. In Pandora's Gamble, investigative reporter Alison Young reveals the shockingly lax approaches to safety - even at prestigious institutions - that are putting all of us at risk.
In addition to the extensive endnotes published in Pandora's Gamble, some additional source records will be highlighted here.
2019 H5N1 incident
On December 9, 2019, the Kawaoka lab at the University of Wisconsin-Madison had a safety breach involving one of the world’s most infamous lab-created “gain of function” viruses. But UW didn't report the incident to the NIH Office of Science Policy, which oversees U.S. research with engineered pathogens, until February 10, 2020. Under the transparency requirements of the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules, such incident reports are public records, yet the report and some of the related correspondence released to me by NIH under a federal Freedom of Information Act request is stamped "CONFIDENTIAL." The report also includes a note that says: "*Confidential – do not release this information without written authorization of the
University of Wisconsin-Madison." Read more about this incident in Chapter 15 of Pandora's Gamble, and in this excerpt published by USA TODAY.
2015 responses to Gryphon Scientific "gain of function" site visit
In the summer of 2015, as part of the U.S. government’s review of the risks and benefits of gain-of-function research of concern, a team of scientists from Gryphon Scientific visited with officials at the University of Wisconsin-Madison to learn more about their policies and procedures for detecting the potential loss of containment when experimenting with laboratory enhanced H5N1 influenza viruses. This document, obtained through a public records request I filed with the local Madison and Dane County health department, reveals UW’s written answers to the Gryphon team’s questions, which were circulated among themselves and a member of the local health department the day before the site visit. In this document – contrary to what happened after the December 2019 H5N1 PAPR incident -- UW told Gryphon that workers with potential exposures would not be treated any differently than workers who were certainly exposed. “People with a known potential exposure would be immediately quarantined as described above. Following any potential exposure, the individual is immediately quarantined until there is consultation with university and local/state public health officials, the PI [principal investigator] and laboratory staff member.” Other revelatory details about the Kawaoka lab’s practices are also disclosed in this document.
2013 H5N1 needlestick incident
In November 2013, a member of the Kawaoka research team accidentally pierced their finger with a needle that had an engineered H5N1 virus on it.
2013 NIH concerns about a lack of dedicated quarantine facility, biosafety
Following a 2013 needlestick incident, NIH officials were surprised to learn that UW-Madison lacked a dedicated quarantine facility.
2013 H5N1 spill incident
This is a copy of the incident report referenced in NIH's correspondence expressing concerns about biosafety practices during 2013.
USDA National Animal Disease Center
Enforcement records show the USDA National Animal Disease Center in Ames, Iowa, had three releases of wastewater that was potentially contaminated with select agent pathogens.
2019-2020 wastewater releases