Pandora's Gamble: Lab Leaks, Pandemics, and a World At Risk

UW-Madison

In the summer of 2015, as part of the U.S. government’s review of the risks and benefits of gain-of-function research of concern, a team of scientists from Gryphon Scientific visited with officials at the University of Wisconsin-Madison to learn more about their policies and procedures for detecting the potential loss of containment when experimenting with laboratory enhanced H5N1 influenza viruses. This document, obtained through a public records request I filed with the local Madison and Dane County health department, reveals UW’s written answers to the Gryphon team’s questions, which were circulated among themselves and a member of the local health department the day before the site visit. In this document – contrary to what happened after the December 2019 H5N1 PAPR incident --  UW told Gryphon that workers with potential exposures would not be treated any differently than workers who were certainly exposed. “People with a known potential exposure would be immediately quarantined as described above. Following any potential exposure, the individual is immediately quarantined until there is consultation with university and local/state public health officials, the PI [principal investigator] and laboratory staff member.” Other revelatory details about the Kawaoka lab’s practices are also disclosed in this document.